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I. INTRODUCTION
The content generated by users on social media is rich in
personal information that can be mined to construct accurate
user profiles, and subsequently used for tailored advertising or
other personalized services. Facebook has recently come under
scrutiny after a third party gained access to the data of millions
of users and mined it to construct psychographical profiles,
which were allegedly used to influence voters in elections. As
part of a possible solution to avoid data breaches while still
being able to perform meaningful machine learning (ML) on
social media data, we propose a privacy-preserving algorithm
for k-nearest neighbor (kNN) [1], one of the oldest ML meth-
ods, used traditionally in collaborative filtering recommender
systems.
In our approach, which is based on Secure Multiparty
Computation (SMC) [2], 1000s of users each send encrypted
shares of their data to two non-colluding service clouds, nick-
named Alice and Bob in Fig. 1. When a new instance for user
Carol has to be classified, it is split into encrypted shares and
sent to Alice and Bob, who subsequently engage in a secure
kNN protocol. In the end, Alice and Bob each hold a share of
the final result. They disclose the shares to the user and/or the
advertisement server on the social media platform, which can
use it to decide which advertisements to display. Throughout
this process, none of the users sees the data of any of the other
users in an unencrypted way. In addition, the computational
servers Alice and Bob never see the unencrypted data from
Carol nor from any of the 1000s of training users.
II. RELATED WORK
Given the popularity of kNN in machine learning and data
mining, it is not surprising that efforts have already been made
to perform kNN in a privacy-preserving manner. Our goal is
to keep both the training data and the query instance private,
unlike existing methods that assume that the query point is
publicly known [3], [4], or that leak which instances are among
the k nearest neighbors [5]. Unlike differential privacy based
methods that trade accuracy for privacy [6], [7], our protocols
produce the exact same outcome and accuracy as in the clear.
Furthermore, our interest is in scenarios where the original
training data is owned by 1000s of users instead of the scenario
Fig. 1. Architecture of the two-server model for secure kNN
where all training data is owned by one party, as in [8], [9]
and most of [10].
Rane and Boufounos [10] do provide a sketch on how to
perform privacy-preserving 1NN in the multi-party case (as
we consider) based on the use of Shamir’s secret sharing
as described in [2]. We use additive secret sharing instead,
because it is computationally cheaper and has better round
complexity, i.e. a lower number of sequential steps in the
protocol (discounting on operations that can be done in par-
allel). The main differences and improvements of our work
over that of Rane and Boufounos [10] are that we propose a
protocol for privacy-preserving kNN – which is considerably
more challenging than 1NN – and that we go well beyond a
mere sketch by presenting an implementation and experimental
TABLE I
TIME TO PRIVATELY CLASSIFY A NEW INSTANCE, AND CLASSIFICATION
ACCURACY MEASURED OVER 1500 TEST INSTANCES
Training Data Runtime (min) Accuracy
k Set Size Sort-and-Swap Threshold-kSelect
16 500 19.81 2.79 66.41
16 5000 180.88 31.98 68.40
16 8000 345.03 50.69 66.04
32 500 36.24 2.80 65.82
32 5000 285.44 32.29 67.79
32 8000 454.01 50.63 69.84
evaluation of the protocols, which allows us to measure
runtimes.
III. METHODS AND RESULTS
We use data of 9500 Facebook users and 600 items (pages)
collected in the myPersonality project [11]. For each of the
users u and each of the items i, the dataset contains informa-
tion on whether user u has clicked on the like button for item
i, i.e. u(i) = 1 or not, i.e. u(i) = 0. “Likes” information can
be used to infer all kinds of user characteristics, including
personality, and demographics (see e.g. [12], [13]). In our
experiments we use it to derive the gender of the user. The
reported runtime results are similar for any other label that
one might be interested in to derive.
To measure the proximity of users, we use the Jaccard
distance, which is an appropriate metric to use in kNN when
dealing with sparse data such as likes information. We de-
signed a cryptographic protocol that allows Alice and Bob from
Fig. 1 to securely compute the numerator and the denominator
of the Jaccard distance between 2 users for which they have
shares (such as the data of new user Carol and the data of
any training user). Using this protocol for secure computation
of the Jaccard distance, we developed and implemented two
different algorithms that allow Alice and Bob to infer the class
label for a new user with kNN in a privacy-preserving manner.
The first algorithm combines the Jaccard distance computa-
tion with an algorithm for oblivious sorting [14] to sort the first
k elements. We then use an oblivious swap circuit to iterate
through the rest of the training examples and swap them with
the first k elements wherever required thereby ensuring that
the first k distances are the smallest distances among all the
training examples. We call this method Sort-and-Swap kNN.
The second algorithm is based on the algorithm for finding
the top k elements proposed by Vaidya and Clifton [15]
(using Yao’s secure comparison) and used by Burkhart and
Dimitropoulos [16] (based on Shamir’ secret sharing scheme).
This algorithm finds the k nearest elements without requiring
sorting at all, namely by iteratively looking for a cut-off point
through doing binary search among the distances. We call this
method Threshold-kSelect kNN.
We implemented the Sort-and-Swap and Threshold-kSelect
algorithms above in the SMC framework Lynx.1 The reported
runtimes reported in Table I are the average of 3 executions,
1https://bitbucket.org/uwtppml/lynx
run in two AWS EC2 instances (Alice and Bob) with 36 vCPUs
and 72 GB RAM.
The Threshold-kSelect kNN algorithm, which does not
involve any sorting at all, is significantly faster than the Sort-
and-Swap algorithm. Moreover, unlike for the Sort-and-Swap
algorithm, increasing the value of k does not cause a signif-
icant increase in the runtimes of the Threshold-kSelect kNN
algorithm. Even though the asymptotic complexity of Sort-
and-Swap kNN is O(kn) and the complexity of threshold-
kSelect kNN is O(n log n), the latter is faster as it involves
independent microservices running in parallel. This is not the
case with Sort-and-Swap kNN as each swap operation has to
happen sequentially.
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